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Constantly increasing requirements on road safety lead to the development of new 
technologies and safety systems implemented in motor vehicles. Most of these 
systems help prevent accidents or reduce the severity of subsequent damage to 
persons and property occurred during an accident. However, these systems do 
not contribute to reduce the delay of the first aid ensured to injured persons. 
This function provides an emergency call system, which is capable of immediate 
detection of traffic accidents and ensures automatic transfer of information about 
the accident to the emergency call center. The information transfer is realized via 
GSM network, which may be disrupted by certain risk factors. The article presents 
the outcomes of the experiments in which these factors were evaluated.
Sažetak
Stalno povećanje zahtjeva za sigurnošću na cesti dovelo je do razvoja novih tehnologija 
i sigurnosnih sustava koji se primjenjuju na motorna vozila. Većina ovih sustava 
pomaže spriječiti nesreće ili ublažiti njihove posljedice na ljude i imovinu. Međutim, ovi 
sustavi ne doprinose smanjenju vremenskog perioda koji je potreban da prva pomoć 
stigne do ozlijeđenih. Ova funkcija omogućuje sustav poziva hitne službe koji smjesta 
otkriva nesreće na cesti i automatski prenosi podatke o nesreći do pozivnog centra 
hitne službe. Prijenos podataka ostvaruje se pomoću GSM mreže, koju mogu ometati 
određeni faktori rizika. U ovom radu izloženi su rezultati eksperimenata u kojima su se 
ovi faktori procjenjivali.
INTRODUCTION
Traffic accidents can be considered from the perspective of 
constantly developing road transportation networks as its 
unfavourable, but unfortunately also irrepresible part. In some 
traffic accidents its participants get into a situation, in which they 
are unable to use a mobile phone to call for emergency services, 
e.g. due to injuries, or they aren’t able to give exact location of 
the accident. Both of these situations lead to a possible delay in 
providing first aid to the injured persons, which can cause fatal 
consequences. [1], [2]
In-vehicle system eCall is an emergency call system, which 
is designed for automatic transfer of information about a traffic 
accident via the GSM network to an emergency call center to 
ensure the first aid to injured persons as soon as possible. 
Activation of the eCall system could be realized in two different 
ways – automatically by signal comming from airbags unit, if 
a car crash occures with a deceleration exceeding predefined 
limit resulting in airbag activation (technical standard CSN 
EN 16072 allows alternative ways of automatic activation), or 
manually by passengers, if they get stuck in an emergency 
situation.  [3], [4], [5]
Under the head of the E-MERGE project has been performed 
a study based on evaluation of benefits that eCall system 
carries out, primarily focused on reduction of delays between 
a car accident occures and arrival of rescuers. Results are shown 
below:
 - reduce the response time to the accident of about 50% in 
non-urban areas and 40% in urban areas; 
 - reduce injuries within EU25 of about 15% to save up to 
2 500 lives per year. [6]
At the moment of the traffic accident, the eCall system is 
activated (manually or automatically) and immediately starts 
to dial up an emergency call, which is able to transmit besides 
the voice also other information about the accident to the 
nearest public-safety answering point (PSAP). The voice call 
enables passengers to communicate with the eCall operator 
and at the same time a minimum set of data (MSD) is sent to the 
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operator. MSD contains detailed information about the accident 
– its exact location, time, vehicle information, eCall status and 
information about service provider. [3], [7], [8]
To ensure reliable function of eCall system it is necessary to 
assess possible risk factors that may occure in real traffic and 
cause disruption of its function, which may mean potentional 
threat for seriously injured passengers.      
RISK FACTORS ANALYSIS
As was stated in the previous chapter, function of the eCall 
system may be, under certain conditions, limited or completely 
interrupted. For the process of identifying risk factors, which 
may cause these disruptions, Ishikawa’s cause-and-effect 
diagram was used. These risk factors were divided into two 
categories according to their characteristics – procedural and 
structural. The first category contains factors, which are affected 
by human activities, the second one are mostly caused by 
objects or surrounding properties. [9]    
After the step of identifying factors by Ishikawa diagram, 
Saaty Method of quantitative pair comparison was applied on its 
output to obtain quantitative information showing the severity 
of the negative effects of risk factors affecting disruptions of 
eCall system function. For the assessment of every single risk 
factor Saaty‘s scale with the scale of significance 1 - 9 was used.
The Table 1 below shows the output from Saaty matrix with 
preferential numbers Ri and weight indexes vi.
Both categories of risks - procedural as well as structural 
assessed by Saaty Method - were sorted according to the values 
of preferential numbers Ri and placed into graph shown below, 
see Figure 1. The graph was then complemented with Lorentz 
curve and Pareto principle with the reliability ratio 60:40.
Table 1 Saaty matrix output
Order Risk number Risk type Ri vi Risk
1. 4 structural 5.63 0.208 Unavailable/Missing GSM signal
2. 5 structural 4.20 0.155 GSM shielding by random structures
3. 1 structural 3.78 0.140 Frequency disturbances
4. 2 procedural 3.25 0.420 Intentional signal shielding
5. 5 procedural 2.95 0.380 Intentional GSM jammer usage
6. 2 structural 2.82 0.104 GSM shielding by car body
7. 12 structural 1.47 0.054 Damaged antenna
8. 8 structural 1.24 0.046 Damaged OBU in a crash
9. 7 structural 1.17 0.043 Flooding of OBU
10. 18 structural 1.00 0.037 Faulty installation of OBU
11. 14 structural 0.91 0.034 OBU error
12. 11 structural 0.87 0.032 Power supply interruption
13. 3 procedural 0.81 0.100 Intentional antenne disconnection 
14. 16 structural 0.74 0.027 Temperature out of range
15. 13 structural 0.69 0.025 Support systems failure
16. 10 structural 0.63 0.023 Short circuit
17. 1 procedural 0.50 0.060 Intentional OBU disconnection
18. 15 structural 0.47 0.017 Software error
19. 17 structural 0.43 0.016 Incorrect data input
20. 9 structural 0.38 0.014 Car fire
21. 6 structural 0.32 0.012 Influence of high-voltage lines
22. 3 structural 0.30 0.011 External magnetic field
23. 4 procedural 0.26 0.030 Changes in circuits by user
Source: authors
Figure 1 Risk factors ranked according to their severity. 
Source: authors
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Both of the previous steps enable to determine the 
treshold of the risk severity. According to this, risks lying 
above the treshold have been assessed as the most severe 
and were therefore subjected to further experimental 
investigation. Conversely, risks lying under the treshold were 
excluded from the investigation because of their low severity 
and also potentialy low influence on the eCall function. 
The main objective of experiments, which have been 
performed, was to verify or refute theoretically obtained data 
by risk analysis. Because the threshold had been determined, 
only five out of twenty three highest severity risks were 
investigated: 
 - missing / unavailable GSM signal
 - GSM shielding by random structures
 - frequency disturbances 
 - intentional signal shielding
 - intentional signal jammer usage
EXPERIMENTAL SECTION
This chapter describes process of every single experiment 
focused on investigation of the most severe risks, mentioned 
above. Outputs obtained from experiments should 
allow to verify data acquired from risk analysis and to 
suggest appropriate corrective measures if possible. Every 
experimental measurement was run under real conditions 
corresponding to the real environment, where eCall system 
is supposed to be used. [10, 11]
All the measurements were performed on ONI System 
monitoring on-board unit, see Figure 2: 
Figure 2 ONI System on-board unit
Source: authors
The first experiment was performed to determine the level 
of the negative impact on eCall system when the car equipped 
with OBU is passing through a route located in a geographical 
area without guaranteed GSM network coverage - the route has 
been selected according to the information about the availability 
of the signal obtained from mobile network operators and 
verified by an ordinary mobile phone. Total lenght of this route 
was about 6km and an average speed of measuring vehicle was 
set to 40km/h.
During this experiment on-board unit was used to measure 
values of current GSM signal intensity (units: dBm) in specified 
intervals set by GPS coordinates. That means every measured 
value of GSM intensity was assigned to the exact coordinates, 
which enables to track progression of the signal availability on 
the route and also enables to find exact location of signal loss, 
where some random shielding structures might be found. 
Within the first experiment there were 6 measurements 
performed overall, collecting 390 values of GSM intensity which 
were statistically processed (see table 2) and placed into the graph 
2 ilustrated by Figure 3. All units describing intensity of the GSM 
signal are in dBm. The lowest intensity takes the value -113dBm (= 
unavailability), the highest intensity takes up to -51dBm.







[dBm] Dispersion Std. deviation
1. -97.04 -113 -85 -97 36.78 6.07
2. -96.68 -107 -85 -95 38.68 6.22
3. -95.89 -107 -83 -97 44.56 6.68
4. -97.39 -105 -83 -99 44.49 6.67
5. -96.39 -113 -87 -97 41.85 6.47
6. -97.07 -113 -83 -97 79.71 8.93
Source: authors
Figure 3 Progress of the GSM signal availability on the selected route.
Source: authors
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The second experiment was carried out to evaluate 
the possibility of disruption of eCall system function by 
intentional GSM signal shielding caused by a user (driver). 
One of the most probable ways to create a shielding barrier 
at home conditions is to use the principle of Faraday cage. 
For this reason common materials were chosen, as cardboard 
for creating a supporting structure and aluminum foil with 
thickness of 15 µm for ensuring its shielding effect. The 
whole body of the OBU has been closed into this cage and 
measuring of the GSM signal availability could start. 
Within this experiment, four measurements were 
performed. The first one was used to collect referential values 
of the GSM signal intensity at selected area. During the second, 
the third and the fourth measurement values of the intensity 
while shielding OBU by the aluminum foil of thickness 15 
µm, 30 µm and 45 µm were collected. Outcomes from these 
measurements are shown in the Table 3, respectively on the 
Figure 3. The blue line ilustrates referential values of the GSM 
signal intensity at selected area.
Note: To successful shielding of a mobile phone the 
thickness of 15 µm aluminum foil is sufficient. 
The third experiment was performed to evaluate the 
possibility of intentional GSM signal jamming by a device 
(see Figure 5) generating disturbing low-power signals in 
the spectrum of frequencies equal to mobile phone network. 
Such device prevents the communication between the on-
board unit and an emergency call center, so at the moment of 
a traffic accident it is not possible to transfer any information 
about the situation, even though the capability of on-board 
unit to detect the accident stay retained. Moreover, usage of 
the jammer may also cause malfunction of mobile phones in 
the vicinity of an accident, which could make it impossible to 
call emergency services even by witnesses of the accident.
During this experiment there were only two measurements 
performed due to expected and clear results. Referential values 
of the signal intensity at selected area were taken over from the 
previous experiment because it ran under the same conditions. 
Other values were collected in two different arrangement of 
OBU and jammer. At first, both devices were placed next to each 
other, which may be taken as an example of a situation, when 
the driver knows, where the OBU is hidden in the car’s interior. 
Subsequently, the OBU with its antenna was placed close to 
widescreen and the jammer was positioned between the front 
seats, which may illustrate a situation, when the exact possition 
of OBU is unknown. Measured data are shown in Table 4 and 
ilustrated by Figure 6.








[dBm] Dispersion Std. deviation %
Referential - 68.41 - 71 - 65 - 71 8.36 2.89 100
15 µm - 83.71 - 91 - 79 - 85 8.44 2.90 81.7
30 µm - 86.41 - 95 - 79 - 87 21.06 4.59 79.2
45 µm - 92.53 - 95 - 91 - 91 3.07 1.75 73.9
Source: authors
Figure 4 Dependence of the GSM signal availability on the shielding structure properties. 
Source: authors
Figure 5  The jammer
Source: authors
Jammed spectrum:  
Output power:
Effective range:
850–894 MHz, 925–960 MHz, 
1805–1880 MHz, 1900–1980 MHz, 
2110–2170 MHz.
0.5 W
2 – 8 m
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RESULTS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The data recorded during all experimental measurements show 
that some of the investigated risk factors can have significant 
negative effect on eCall system, resulting in restriction or even 
complete disruption of its clutch function. 
The most significant negative effect was noticed in 
the third experiment, representing an intentional usage of 
jamming device or unintentional frequency disturbances 
caused by random sources. In this case, the on-board unit was 
completely out of order all the time because its reciever was 
overwhelmed by disruptive signal, as illustrates Figure 6. It is 
also important to note the jammer, placed in a vehicle, may 
disrupt function of all passengers‘ mobile phones as well as it 
may cause unavailability of GSM signal of nearby the vehicles. 
This should be seen as a potential threat if an emergency 
situation occures.
As a possible way, how to reduce such negative influence 
of signal jamming on eCall function, may be application of 
high quality shielding of OBU’s body and its antenna cable 
and also installation of an external antenna on the top of a car 
body. What should be also kept in mind is that using a GSM 
jammer is illegal in most of the european countries, but still 
there are many opportunities to purchase it on the market.
Slightly less severe results were obtained from the second 
experiment, where the possibility of an intentional signal 
shielding was investigated. A closer look on the Figure 4 
suggests that shielding construction used in this experiment 
didn’t cause any signal loss, but significantly lowered its 
intensity. The difference between a referential value and a 
value while shielding reaches up to 26% on average. That 
means if the referential signal intensity was lower, e.g. about 
-95 dBm, then the same shielding structure may cause some 
serious signal losses. Moreover, if any of more sophisticated 
shielding ways were used, like a packing made of lead sheets, 
then a signal loss may occure independently of the actual 







[dBm] Dispersion Std. deviation %
Referential - 68.41 - 71 - 65 - 71 8.36 2.89 100
1. - 113 - 113 - 113 - 113 0 0 0
2. - 113 - 113 - 113 - 113 0 0 0
Source: authors
Figure 6 Influence of signal jamming on its availability
Source: authors
signal intensity.
To prevent a possibility of OBU shielding or shielding its 
antenna, countermeasures should be done primarily based on 
OBU design – its shape and/or possitioning in the car’s interior. 
It is possible to integrate OBU into other electronic car parts, 
e. g. airbag units, which is often hidden under the middle of 
the dashboard, or place the OBU separately into construction 
of the dashboard. Due to such placement of OBU or/and its 
antenna, it should be way more difficult to make an effective 
shielding.
As the least severe risk factors might be considered missing 
/ unavailable GSM signal and GSM shielding by random 
structures due to the first experiment output, even though 
these risks were assessed as the most severe during the risk 
analysis. The reason of different results is most likely caused 
by conditions set for the first experiment – parameters of the 
selected route and the measurement method.
The Figure 3 shows progression of the signal intensity on 
the route, where six measurements were performed in total. 
Even though the signal coverage was not guaranteed and 
was proven by mobile phone measurements, OBU was able 
to keep relatively stable communication with the network. 
Only during 3 out of 6 measurements some signal losses were 
detected, where the longest one lasted for tens of seconds, 
other ones didn’t exceed a few seconds. But it is important 
to keep in mind that these measurements were carried out at 
low speed around 40 km/h, which means these signal losses 
were in terms of distance at least around 15 meters long. Such 
a length is enough to be potentially dangerous if an accident 
occures in it, because its detection may not be successful.
At this point it would be difficult to suggest any 
countermeasures due to technological limitations. The on-
board unit, used for all experiments mentioned in this article, 
has proved its ability to operate with very low intensity signal 
due to an external antenna and high sensitive GSM reciever. 
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However, there still cannot be given any guarantee of no 
signal losses, because of landscape character and partially 
inhomogeneous signal coverage (relates to the Czech 
Republic), which is fortunately still improving.
Contents of this article showed evaluation of some risk 
factors of eCall system based on an experimental basis, which 
may occure in real taffic and should be taken into account 
before eCall will be put into live operation, which is scheduled 
for the beginning of the year 2017. 
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